Built around a single successful login, since that’s the scenario that actually needs judgment: was anything done with the access, and how far does a non-admin compromise really reach. Swap in your own log excerpt and role details and the reasoning holds.
Security
Build a post-incident hardening checklist after a brute-force attack
A brute-force wave against wp-login.php that ended in one successful login on a non-admin account, worked through to confirm the blast radius, contain it, and turn it into a hardening checklist that actually prevents a repeat.
Works with Claude / GPT137 uses★ 4.3
The prompt
security-post-incident-hardening-checklist
Server logs for the last 6 hours show this: [- 14,213 failed login attempts against /wp-login.php from a rotating pool of roughly 200 IPs, concentrated on the usernames "admin" and "editor" - One successful login on the "editor" account at 03:14 UTC, password matches a hash that appears in a public breach dump - "editor" holds the Editor role, not Administrator - No new plugins, themes, or files created since the successful login - Uptime monitoring shows no downtime and no defacement] Work through this the way an incident responder would: 1. Scope the compromise from the one successful login. Editor role can't install plugins, but it can edit any post, inject scripts into post content, and see other users' drafts. Given that, what exactly needs checking: post revision history since 03:14, any new pages or redirects, whether editor's application passwords or connected integrations were touched, and whether any admin account shows signs of privilege escalation attempts right after. 2. Immediate containment before investigation goes further: force-terminate the editor account's active sessions, reset its password, and check whether the same password is reused on any admin-level account on this site or others the same person manages. 3. Once contained, turn this into a hardening checklist that targets the actual attack pattern shown in the logs, not a generic list: username enumeration (admin/editor as targets), credential stuffing (breach-dump password reuse), and login endpoint exposure. Cover rate limiting or login lockouts, renaming obvious usernames, mandatory 2FA for any role above Subscriber, and blocking or challenging the IP ranges seen in the log. 4. State the one condition that would make you escalate this to a full forensic review instead of closing it out with the checklist, for example any sign the editor account touched files, users, or settings outside what its role permits.